Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare

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Contents

I. Two Doctrines 1

II. Targets of Soviet Intelligence 14

III. The Illegal *Residentura* and the New Identity 39

IV. Departure from Moscow 52

V. The Operative's Biography 57

VI. Entry into the Underground 62

VII. Business Cover 68

VIII. Where the Operative Makes His Home 77

IX. The Apparatus 84

X. Recruitment of "Sources" 93

XI. Clandestine Meetings. Eluding Surveillance 110

XII. Bait 126

XIII. Communications 146

XIV. Chinks in the Agent's Armor 155

XV. Guerrilla Warfare 164

XVI. Evaluation of Information 184

I. Two Doctrines

The importance of intelligence service in the fortunes of nations cannot be overstated. The United States learned this the hard way when it was caught by surprise at Pearl Harbor. This country had no secret agents in Japan to warn Washington of Japan's war plans and of the impending attack. The existence or absence of a well-working spy network on the territory of a potential enemy may spell the difference between victory and defeat. It is now known that the Russians, who long before World War II had taken pains to build up an effective network in Japan, received timely information from their underground resident in Tokyo, Richard Sorge, that Japan would not attack the Soviet Union but would definitely strike at the United States, "probably in December (1941), but not later than January, 1942."

The only people on whom the United States government depended for information at that crucial period were the American naval and military attachés in Tokyo. But the official attachés are rarely able to uncover the secret plans of a government to which they are accredited because the counterintelligence agencies of that government take special measures to impede the attempts of the attachés to collect vital information and often succeed in misleading them with misinformation. This is exactly what happened with the American

naval attaché in Tokyo who informed Washington a day before the attack on Pearl Harbor that he did not expect a surprise attack because the Japanese fleet continued to be anchored at the main base of Yokosuka, as evidenced by large crowds of sailors in the streets of Tokyo. However, the naval attaché was grievously mistaken. At that very time the Japanese fleet was already well on its way to Pearl Harbor. The sailors crowding the streets of Tokyo were not sailors at all but soldiers dressed as navy men to deceive the Americans and conceal the departure of the fleet on its fateful mission.

Evidently due to the fact that the oceans surrounding this country had been regarded for centuries as impregnable defenses, this country was not overly preoccupied with building up its intelligence networks abroad and allowed its intelligence service to lag far behind those of other countries. General George C. Marshall frankly admitted at the Senate Committee on Military Affairs (Oct. 18, 1945) that until World War II the American intelligence abroad was "little more than what a military attaché could learn at a dinner, more or less, over the coffee cups." [1] When in 1941 President Roosevelt asked Colonel William J. Donovan to organize an intelligence service (the O.S.S.), he told Donovan: "You will have to begin with nothing. We have no intelligence service." [2] Dwight D. Eisenhower,[3] also deplored the "shocking deficiency" of American intelligence at the outset of

1 *Hearings*, "Department of Armed Forces," 79th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Oct. 18, 1945.

2 William Donovan, "Intelligence: Key to Defense," *Life*, Sept. 30, 1946.

3 *Crusade in Europe* (New York, 1948), p. 32.

the war, and General Omar Bradley [4] stated that "the British easily outstripped their American colleagues" in military intelligence. The state of the so-called diplomatic intelligence was no less deplorable. Dean Acheson testified before a Congressional committee in 1945 that prior to World War II, the Department of State's "technique of gathering information differed only by reason of the typewriter and telegraph from the techniques which John Quincy Adams was using in St. Petersburg and Benjamin Franklin was using in Paris."

Till the advent of the atomic age, neglected intelligence and miscalculations resulting from it could lead a country to serious debacles and even to partial defeat, but the character and tempo of war were such that the country could still mobilize in a hurry and, while holding off the enemy, build up its weapons production and get ready for the final showdown. When Hitler started World War II, Germany greatly outnumbered the Allies in tanks, planes, and armored divisions. Hitler hoped by blitzkrieg strategy to achieve a quick victory before the Allies had time to mobilize and arm themselves. However, the Allies made good use of the precious element of time that was running out and converted their industrial might to arms production. The United States proclaimed itself the "arsenal of democracy" and, having put its enormous productive capacity at the disposal of the Allies, outproduced the Axis in war planes, tanks, ships, and everything else.

The introduction of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles capable of wiping out whole cities and industrial centers in a single attack has radically changed

4 *A Soldier's Story* (New York, 1951), p. 33.

the nature of war. The *time element,* which previously allowed a country that lagged behind to catch up with the enemy, no longer exists. There is no longer any margin for error. A world power which is determined to survive cannot allow itself to fall behind its potential enemy in striking or retaliatory power. A major scientific breakthrough in the field of weaponry achieved by one side and unnoticed by the other may spell defeat for the country whose intelligence service slept on the job.

The country unable to pinpoint the exact location of the missile sites of the enemy loses the power to retaliate, a circumstance which may embolden the enemy to attack without fear of reprisals. Under these perilous conditions, when countries possess the means to break each other's backbones with a single nuclear stroke, no responsible government can allow itself to conduct its foreign affairs blindly. As the Hoover Commission rightly concluded in its findings, "the fate of the Nation may well rest on accurate and complete intelligence data which may serve as a trustworthy guide for top-level decisions on policy and action in a troubled world . . ." [5] Since 1955, when this was written, new conquests have been made in space, new weapons have been added to the arsenals of the big powers, and the international situation has gravely deteriorated.

To remain in the dark today about the intentions and the military capabilities of a potential enemy is a sure way to national disaster. That is why the role of intelligence in our critical times has become more cru-

5 *Intelligence Activities,* p. 25, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Report to Congress, June 1955.

cial than ever before in history. This is equally true in relation to the two mightiest powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, which confront each other in the titanic contest that is shaping up in the world. Since an intelligence gap may be as fatal to a country as a missile gap, it would be very useful to try to gauge and compare the performance of the intelligence agencies of the countries of the Soviet bloc and of the West. But this lies outside the scope of this volume. Here I shall limit myself to the examination of the difference between the intelligence doctrines adopted by the intelligence services of the Russians and of their Western rivals.

Like the Western intelligence services, the Russians collect information about foreign states from two principal sources: from secret informants and undercover agents and from legitimate sources—such as military and scientific journals, various research material, records of parliamentary debates, etc. The Russians regard as true intelligence (*razvedka*) only the first type of information—procured by undercover agents and secret informants in defiance of the laws of the foreign country in which they operate. The second type of information, obtained from legitimate sources and publications, is considered by the Russians simply as *research data.* According to the views of Russian officers, it takes a *man* to do the creative and highly dangerous work of underground intelligence on foreign soil; as to the digging up of research data in the safety of the home office or library, this can be left to women or young lieutenants who have just begun intelligence careers. The Western intelligence services

on the other hand treat both types of information as intelligence, often with a much higher regard for research than for undercover work.

It is in the attitude of the Soviet and Western intelligence agencies toward these two types of information that the difference between their intelligence doctrines begins to emerge. This difference is not only theoretical, but is tied pragmatically to every phase of intelligence activity, beginning with matters of planning, strategy, and evaluation of the procured information, from the point of view of reliability and its worth, to policymaking by leaders of the state.

Both the Soviet and the Western intelligence services strive to obtain information about the secret intentions, capabilities, and strategic plans of other states. But the Soviets and the West approach this task differently. The Russians take the view that important secrets of foreign states can and should be procured directly from the classified files in the government departments of those states and from foreign civil servants who agree to turn over state secrets to the Soviet Union. When the Russians suspect that another country is trying to form a coalition against the Soviet Union, they do not seek information about it in newspaper editorials, panel discussions, or in historical precedents that show how the countries concerned had acted in similar situations in the past, although all these sources may be enlightening to a certain extent. The Russian intelligence service goes out to steal the secret diplomatic correspondence between the conspiring states or to recruit a secret informant on the staff of the negotiators if they do not have one there already. When the Russians want to know the number of bombers in the air force of a potential adversary, they

arrive at a figure—not by library research on the productive capacity of certain plants or by collecting educated guesses or rumors on the subject but by interviewing their secret informers in the foreign air force or war ministry and by stealing the coveted information from governmental files.

On the other hand, the Americans, and to a certain extent the British, prefer to rely more heavily in their intelligence work on the collection of information about foreign states from legitimately accessible sources, such as library research, foreign newspapers, military and scientific journals, foreign parliamentary debates, encyclopedias, and statistics. According to a reliable source, the American intelligence agencies monitor as many as five million words daily from foreign radio broadcasts alone (which equals fifty books of average length) and condense them into a few short pages which are forwarded to interested departments. From that enormous backlog of material obtained through legitimate research, the intelligence officers and trained analysts derive, process, and distill much information about foreign countries, their economies and finances, industries, agriculture and trade, populations and social trends, education, political systems, structure of governments, and biographical data on political and military leaders. Drawing on that colossal collection of data, the intelligence officers write intelligence reports and estimates of situations under study and compose the so-called *national estimates* of foreign countries for the benefit of the government policymakers.

Admiral Ellis Zacharias, who was deputy chief of Naval Intelligence in World War II, wrote that in the Navy 95 per cent of peacetime intelligence was derived from legitimately accessible sources, another four per

cent came from semiopen sources, and only one per cent was procured through secret agents.[6] This means that the Navy had no network of spies and secret agents and apparently preferred to base its intelligence work on legitimate sources. Another authority on American intelligence, General William J. Donovan, who headed the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.) during the war, expressed the same predilection of American intelligence toward "open sources" by saying that intelligence is not the "mysterious, even sinister" thing people think it is, but is more a matter of "pulling together myriad facts, making a pattern of them, and drawing inferences from that pattern." [7]

This predilection of American intelligence toward "open sources"—as opposed to networks of spies and undercover agents—lies at the core of the *American doctrine of intelligence.*

How can the intelligence officers pick important developments from the vast encyclopedic data that flow into the intelligence agency? One of the chiefs of American intelligence, a distinguished professor and noted scholar, had this to say on the subject:

"How can surveillance (of the world scene) assure itself of spotting really the unusual?" wrote he. "How can it be sure of putting the finger on the three things per week out of the thousands it observes and the millions that happen that are really of potential import? The answer is: procure the services of wise men—and

6 Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, U.S.N., *Secret Missions, the Story of an Intelligence Officer* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946), pp. 117–18.

7 Recently published works estimate that American intelligence agencies obtain about 80–90 per cent of its information from publicly accessible sources and only 10–20 per cent from secret sources.

wise in the subject—and *pray that their mysterious inner selves are of the kind which produce hypotheses of national importance."*

From the point of view of the Russian intelligence doctrine, such an approach is but one step removed from mysticism and metaphysics. And what if the "mysterious inner selves" of the researchers and analysts fail to produce the right hypotheses? How safe is it, in general, to rely on hypotheses in matters of such profound complexity as world politics, involving a multiplicity of factors, where nothing is stable, and when enemies of yesterday become friends of today and together fight their former allies? A hypothesis may be wisdom itself, except for one thing: it may turn out to be utterly wrong. Not only intelligence officers but statesmen of the highest caliber have time and again been proved wrong when they acted on undeniably wise hypotheses. Thus, for instance, in 1940–41 Stalin based his strategy on the assumption that Hitler would not attack the Soviet Union. Stalin's calculations seemed eminently right, because he knew that it was not in the interests of Germany to get into a two-front war and to take on mighty Russia while at war with England, America, and France. Stalin thought that Hitler understood this too. But as it has turned out, Stalin's logical hypothesis went up in smoke and fires ignited by the bombs of the German Luftwaffe. In the spring of 1941, when the German General Staff began to deploy armored divisions near the Russian borders and Europe was thick with rumors that Germany was getting ready to attack Russia, the British intelligence service was ordered to give its estimate of the situation. The Joint Intelligence Committee of Britain also thought that Hitler would not be so

foolish as to add the powerful Soviet Union to his formidable enemies in the West and concluded that Germany would not invade Russia. Many more examples could be introduced to show how dangerous it is, especially in matters of war and peace, to rely on hypotheses or assumptions which may be truly wise, but wrong in the end.

Stalin, who was his own intelligence boss and who liked to take a personal part in the cloak and dagger business, warned his intelligence chiefs time and again to keep away from hypotheses and "equations with many unknowns" and, instead, to strive to acquire valuable informants and to get at the facts and figures hidden in the secret vaults of foreign governments. He used to say: "An intelligence hypothesis may become your hobby-horse on which you will ride straight into a self-made trap." He called it "dangerous guesswork." For that very reason Stalin in 1932 ordered intelligence to discontinue sending him quarterly surveys of foreign countries which, although based on secret data, were interspersed with unsubstantiated assumptions and subjective views. These surveys corresponded roughly to the *national estimates* which the American intelligence agencies produce for the National Security Council. Thereafter, the NKVD sent Stalin only summaries of important documents stolen from other governments and reports from exceptionally valuable secret informants of the caliber of foreign ambassadors and general staff officers. During his periodic conferences with the chiefs of the intelligence services, Stalin would often interject: "Don't tell me what you think, give me the facts and the source!" But sometimes he would violate his own rule and ask one or another intelligence chief for an opinion. Such was

the case during a joint conference which Stalin and Voroshilov had in the summer of 1936 with the chiefs of the NKVD Intelligence and the Intelligence Department of the Red Army. Stalin asked Artouzov, deputy chief of the military intelligence, the following question: "With whom will Poland side if war breaks out between two coalitions, Germany, Italy and Japan, on the one side, and Russia, France and England, on the other?" Without hesitation Artouzov answered: "Poland will always be with France and England!"—"You are a jackass," retorted Stalin. "If Poland does not side with Germany against us, she will be crushed by the German mechanized divisions on their way to the Soviet Union, and Poland will not live to see another day, whereas if Poland allies herself with Germany, she can hope to expand, if things go well, and, if things go badly, she might still get a chance to negotiate for a settlement." Artouzov did not live to see his prediction come true. He was shot in the great purge, in 1937.

The NKVD Intelligence had never gone into research or studies of publicly available material and based its work 100 per cent on secret sources and undercover agents.[8] The Main Intelligence Department of the Army did study materials from legitimately accessible sources, but only those that dealt with military problems, such as foreign military and scientific journals, army and navy manuals, military textbooks, topographic explorations, and everything that appeared in print anywhere about the armed forces of the world. However, at least 80 per cent of the main

8 In the Soviet Union research from publicly accessible sources is conducted by the Academy of Sciences, universities, scientific journals, and the ministries of Foreign Affairs, industry, trade, finance, and statistics.

efforts of the army intelligence were concentrated on building and operating networks of secret informants and on procuring secret information about the state and strategic plans of the armed forces of various countries.

Had the Soviet intelligence agencies expended their main efforts and resources on building up extensive encyclopedias of worldwide information from overt sources and on processing and analyzing that enormous amount of incoming physical material, they would have never been able to acquire the secrets of the manufacture of the atomic and hydrogen bombs or the blueprints of the American nuclear-powered submarines, nor infiltrate the key departments of the American, British, and other European governments. Important state secrets and especially clues to the intentions and plans of potential enemies *cannot be found in libraries or encyclopedias,* but only where they are being kept under lock and key. The task of intelligence services is to acquire the keys and lay the secrets before their governments and thus provide them with *foreknowledge* and orientation needed to make decisions.

When General Douglas MacArthur, who had been blamed for not having foreseen certain developments in the Korean War, was asked at the Senate investigating committee, in 1951, to explain why the North Korean invasion caught the Americans by surprise, he gave a classical reply from which many an intelligence chief could take his cue. He said: "I don't see how it would have been humanly possible for any men or group of men to predict such an attack as that . . . *There is nothing, no means or methods, except* the accidental *spy methods—if you can get somebody to betray the enemy's highest circles, that can get such information as that.* It is guarded with a secrecy that you cannot overestimate." [9]

Thus, under the fire of the investigation, General MacArthur, who was not an expert in intelligence, mastered his excellent logic and advanced an idea which touches the very nerve of the intelligence problem. *"There is nothing, no means or methods, except . . . spy methods . . . that can get such information as that."* This brings us back to the very essence of the Soviet doctrine of intelligence.

9 *Hearings,* "Military Situation in the Far East," Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, May 5, 1951, Part 1, p. 240.

II. Targets of Soviet Intelligence

Two separate organizations of the Soviet government are engaged in intelligence operations abroad. They are *The Foreign Directorate of the Committee of State Security* (KGB) and *The Main Intelligence Department* (GRU) of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. But while the Intelligence Department of the armed forces conducts only military intelligence, the Foreign Directorate of the Committee of State Security (KGB) is actively engaged in at least eight lines of intelligence and related fields, including military intelligence as well.

The first line, which is considered the most important, is the so-called *diplomatic intelligence,* the purpose of which is to keep the Soviet government informed of the secret deals between the governments of capitalistic countries and of the true intentions and contemplated moves of each of those governments toward the Soviet Union. It is the duty of the Soviet intelligence to procure this information not on the basis of hearsay stories, rationalizations, or speculations, but from primary sources within the secret councils of foreign governments and thus provide the Kremlin with a firm basis of *foreknowledge,* on which to plan and formulate its own policies.

The principal sources of diplomatic intelligence are foreign diplomats, including ambassadors; staff

members of foreign ministries, including code clerks and secretaries; private secretaries to members of the cabinet; and members of parliaments and ambitious politicians who in their quest for political power seek financial aid and left-wing support. The Soviet intelligence studies closely the life history of foreign high officials beginning with their school years, their character traits, weaknesses and vices, intimate lives, and friendships. All this is analyzed with the purpose of finding the Achilles heel of the official and securing the right approach to him through the proper person, who may be a former classmate, an intimate friend, or relative.

In many cases these well-prepared approaches paid off. Some politicians were lured into the Soviet network by promises that the Soviet Union would use its secret levers of influence in their countries to further their political fortunes. These promises were often accompanied by "subsidies," ostensibly for the purpose of promoting good will toward Russia, but in reality intended as a bribe. A number of high officials succumbed to outright offers of money. Others, especially those who in their youth had belonged to Fabian and other idealistic circles, were influenced by humanitarian reasons and persuaded that they must help the Soviet Union to stop the march of Fascism and avert a world war. Considerable success was achieved by the Soviet intelligence among foreign diplomats tinted with homosexual perversions. It is no secret that the biggest concentration of homosexuals can be found in the diplomatic services of Western countries. The Soviet intelligence has made ample use of these unstable individuals. Those of them who agreed to work for the Russian network were instructed to approach other

homosexual members of the diplomatic corps, a strategy which was remarkably successful. Even in those cases where some of the approached declined the offer to collaborate, they did not denounce the recruiter to the authorities. The Soviet intelligence officers were amazed at the sense of mutual consideration and true loyalty among homosexuals.

It is usually thought that it is much easier to lure into the Soviet network a code clerk or secretary than a diplomat or statesman. This viewpoint sounds logical enough, since a man in an important government position is expected to know better than take the road of treachery; and, besides, he has much more to lose, if caught. However, the experience of the Soviet intelligence has, in too many instances, not borne out this point of view. Honesty and loyalty may be often more deeply ingrained in the make-up of simple and humble people than in men of high position. A man who was taking bribes when he was a patrolman does not turn honest when he becomes the chief of police. The only thing that changes is the size of the bribe. Weakness of character and inability to withstand temptation remain with the man no matter how high he climbs. Lightmindedness, wishful thinking, and bad judgment are also traits that accompany the man to the highest rungs of his career.

The consensus of Soviet intelligence chiefs has been that departmental and private secretaries in a foreign ministry are often more valuable as sources of information than an ambassador, because a well-placed secretary can supply documentary data on a wider scale, covering the policies of the foreign government toward a number of countries. However, an ambassador is considered a much bigger prize because he can be used

not only as a source of information, but also as a competent consultant for the Russian Foreign Office, as well as an agent who can influence to a certain extent the foreign policy of his government in the direction desired by the Kremlin.

The second line of the Soviet intelligence activities is *Military Intelligence*. Its task is to procure data on the military strength of Western and Eastern countries; the qualitative and quantitative state of their armies, navies, and air forces; the degree of mechanization, mobility, fire power, technological advancement, and modernization; the productive capacity of the armament industries and the mobilization plans of the big powers.

Soviet intelligence watches with a jealous eye every new invention in the field of arms that appears on the horizon and strives to steal it while it is still in the blueprint stage, or on the drawing board, to enable the Soviet inventors and engineers to come up with the invention first. With the advent of the nuclear and rocketry age, which has completely revolutionized the material base, the strategy, and the very concept of warfare, the Soviet intelligence strains all its efforts to obtain immediate information on the progress being made by the leading Western countries in these decisive fields and to gauge the striking and retaliatory power of the Western world.

Unlike the Main Intelligence Department of the Soviet Army, the Foreign Directorate of the KGB does not look for information in publicly available sources. Neither is it interested in monitoring foreign radio transmissions and distilling from them crumbs of random information. The Foreign Directorate of the KGB

procures the military secrets of foreign governments from the classified files of the general staffs of those countries, from the secret reports of foreign defense ministries, and from military research laboratories and proving grounds. The Foreign Directorate obtains this information the hard way, but when it gets it, no matter how incomplete, the Directorate knows that the data received contain true facts on which the Soviet policy-makers can confidently base conclusions and decisions.

It must be said here that although the Main Intelligence Department of the Soviet Army shares the same practice with Western intelligence services in that it conducts paper research and digests a lot of published material, it lays the principal stress on procuring intelligence from covert sources by clandestine means in the same way as it is done by the Foreign Directorate of the KGB.

In wartime, military intelligence becomes the principal function of every branch of the Intelligence Directorate of the KGB. The main task of its underground *residenturas* (intelligence apparatuses in foreign countries headed by *resident directors*) abroad is to inform the Soviet government by radio and other means about the war plans of the enemy, his troop concentrations and movements, the size of the uncommitted reserves in terms of men and materiel, the extent of the damage inflicted on the enemy by the air forces of the Soviet Union and its allies. The so-called Diplomatic Intelligence concentrates the efforts of its informants and secret agents on watching the relations among the governments of the enemy coalition with special emphasis on friction among them. The Soviet *residenturas* keep a sharp eye also on Russia's allies in

the war and immediately signal the Soviet government if information has been received that an ally of Russia has put out peace feelers or is gravitating toward a separate peace with the enemy. It may be recalled that during World War II, the Kremlin sounded an alarm when it intercepted rumors that British representatives were about to meet in Franco's Spain with emissaries of Hitler. During the worst days of the war, when Russia's defenses were crumbling and the Western allies were slow in opening a second front, there were moments when the Western leaders were jittery at the thought that Stalin might try to save what was left of the country by making a separate peace with Germany.

In wartime, the principal task before all the Soviet *residenturas* abroad (KGB and military) is to keep the government informed of the enemy's grand strategy and his capabilities and vulnerabilities and to furnish the Soviet High Command with data necessary to enable it to work out its own plans and strategy. The day-to-day tactical or *combat* intelligence is taken care of by the intelligence apparatuses of the Soviet armed forces and by the Special Departments (*Osoby Otdel*) of the KGB attached to all army units from regimental strength up. It is their duty to supply the Soviet commander with data on the size, disposition, and fighting strength of the enemy force with which the troops under his command will soon be locked in battle. The standard sources of military intelligence are supplemented with information obtained from enemy headquarters raided by the KGB guerrilla detachments, from ground and aerial photographic reconnaissance, from interrogated prisoners, and from refugees and spies who pose as refugees.

The third line of Soviet intelligence is the so-called *Economic Intelligence*. Contrary to the existing view, the Division of Economic Intelligence had little to do with studying the economy of foreign countries, but was created for the purpose of exercising state control over the Soviet export and import operations, and of protecting the foreign trade of the Soviet Union from the pressures and abuses of the world cartels and other organizations of monopolistic capital. Thus, for instance, the Division of Economic Intelligence discovered in the 1930's that the biggest electric concerns of the world had entered into a so-called gentlemen's agreement by which they obligated themselves not to compete with each other in dealings with Soviet Russia and to overcharge her on her purchases up to 75 per cent of the existing world prices. I have seen a letter signed by a vice-president of the General Electric Co. and addressed to the president of the AEG in Germany, Mr. Bleiman, and to the president of the Swiss Brown Bovery Co., which contained a list of prices made up especially for the Soviet Union that were from 60 to 75 per cent higher than the regular market prices. General Electric considered it necessary to justify the exorbitant prices by stating in its letter that Russia's credit standing in the world was "not too good." This gentlemen's agreement was finally broken up by the Soviet government, but not before Soviet trade had suffered huge losses which amounted to tens of millions of dollars.

The fourth line of Soviet intelligence is so-called *Misinformation*. The Soviet government is interested not only in obtaining information about the policies and impending moves of foreign governments, but also

in misinforming and misleading the governments of foreign countries concerning its own position and intentions. But whereas in the field of procuring secret information from abroad the intelligence officer is given free rein to steal whatever he considers valuable to his country, the task of misinforming the outer world about the Soviet Union cannot be left to the discretion of the individual officer or even of the Soviet intelligence service as a whole. The matter of deciding what information or rumors, if any, should be deviously planted within the earshot of a certain foreign government is a question of high policy in itself and must be subordinated to the specific aims pursued by the Soviet highest policymakers. Misinformation is not just lying for the sake of lying; it is expected to serve as a subtle means of inducing another government to do what the Kremlin wants it to do or to frighten and bluff a foreign government into inaction or into making a concession to the U.S.S.R. Therefore, in the area of misinformation the Soviet intelligence cannot act without specific and clear directives of the government as to the substance of the misinformation and the manner in which it should be launched.

For instance, in the 1930's when the Soviet government sought to obtain a mutual defense treaty with France in order to counteract the growing menace of Hitler's Germany, Soviet intelligence was given instructions to introduce into the channels of the French General Staff (without showing the Soviet's hand) certain pages from a German army report which indicated that Germany was planning to occupy the Rhineland at the beginning of 1936 and to invade France within eighteen months after that. About the same time the Soviet intelligence, also on instructions of the government, tried to

shake England out of her complacency by slipping into British secret channels (through a German double agent) inflated figures of German aircraft production. This created quite a stir in the highest councils of the British government. It was the task of the Misinformation desk of the KGB Intelligence Directorate to fabricate photocopies of ostensibly German documents with such skill that they would look genuine and convincing even to trained military experts.

During the Spanish Civil War, in which a Russian tank brigade fought against the forces of General Franco and Russian pilots flew the newest Soviet fighters (I-15 and I-16) and medium bombers (CB) against the German air squadrons, the Misinformation desk was ordered to introduce into the channels of the German military intelligence service information that the Soviet planes fighting in Spain were not of the latest design and that Russia had in her arsenal thousands of newer planes, of the second and third generation, possessing much greater speed and a higher ceiling. This was not true. Russia had given Spain the best and the newest she had (though in insufficient quantities). This misleading information greatly impressed the German High Command, because when in August 1937 German experts examined and tested two Soviet I-16 fighter planes which landed by mistake on an enemy air strip behind the Madrid sector they were amazed at the quality and performance of the planes, which in some respects surpassed German fighters. After this, the news that the Russians had on the production line still better and more modern models gave the Germans something to think about. Evidently, Stalin wanted to impress on Hitler that the Soviet Union was much stronger and better armed than he thought and that it would be wiser for Germany to have Russia as a partner rather than an opponent.

The fifth line of Soviet intelligence is *Infiltration of Security Agencies and Intelligence Services of Foreign Countries.* This activity contains a special challenge to Soviet intelligence officers and holds for them a peculiar kind of fascination. Although they regard foreign intelligence officers as professional spies (they think of themselves as revolutionaries carrying out dangerous assignments of the party), they do have a feeling of kinship with them and react to a suddenly encountered foreign intelligence agent with the same thrill and curiosity with which two enemy pilots sight each other over the wide spaces in the sky. The general attitude of the Soviet intelligence officer toward his foreign counterpart is hostile, but it is sincerely friendly from the moment the foreign intelligence man becomes an informant for Russia.

The principal aims which the Soviet intelligence pursues by infiltrating foreign intelligence services are:

In relation to security agencies:

To find out what the security agencies of the foreign country know about the activities of the Soviet intelligence on the territory of that country.

To find out whether these agencies have succeeded in planting their counterspies in the Soviet network or in recruiting somebody connected with the *residentura.*

To learn in good time whether the security agencies intend to arrest someone from the Soviet network.

To use the facilities of the foreign security agencies for the purpose of checking on persons in whom the Soviet *residentura* happens to be interested.

In relation to foreign intelligence services, it is important to find out:

Whether the foreign intelligence agency has succeeded in creating a spy network on the territory of Soviet Russia.

Who the spies are in Russia who betray the country to foreign intelligence services.

What secret information had been transmitted from Russia to the foreign intelligence agency.

What lines of communications exist between the secret network in Russia and the foreign intelligence services abroad (such as diplomatic pouch, tourists, and radio transmitters).

In some Western countries the intelligence services enjoy access to the confidential papers of other departments of government, including those of defense and of foreign affairs. The intelligence services justify their right of access to these confidential materials on the ground that (*a*) it helps them to evaluate information obtained from their own secret sources abroad and that (*b*) analysis of the materials from the departments of defense and of foreign affairs in conjunction with their own information from secret sources helps them to render more accurate estimates of the intentions, capabilities, and over-all strength of other countries. Whatever the merits or demerits of such an arrangement are, the Foreign Directorate of the NKVD was quick to take advantage of the convenient concentration of secret documents from various government departments in one place and instructed its *residenturas* abroad to strive to procure from the foreign intelligence services not only the data of the intelligence services themselves, but also the information which they receive from other government departments, such as reports by army, navy, and air attachés, as well as political analyses and estimates furnished by ambassadors.

The Soviet intelligence strives to penetrate the intelligence agencies of foreign states for another reason as well. Although the relations among the intelligence services of the capitalistic countries are not always harmonious, due to rivalry and personal jealousies, they do co-operate with each other to a certain extent in matters of combating Soviet espionage and subversion. Some of them exchange information on the subject and forward to each other photographs of persons known to them as Soviet spies or suspected of being such. The acquisition of this correspondence between foreign intelligence agencies is valuable to the Soviet intelligence because it reveals what is known about Russian intelligence activities and may sometimes tip off the Soviet intelligence that some of its agents are in danger of being exposed and arrested.

It must be said, however, that the secret information procured from foreign intelligence services has rarely given the Soviet intelligence cause for alarm. Much of that information was incompetent, out of date, and as a rule the strength of the Soviet armed forces was ridiculously belittled in it. The reports of the foreign intelligence services on the Soviet espionage activities were based more on hindsight than foresight and frequently contained outright fantasies concocted by unscrupulous doubles and falsifiers. However, if much of the information collected by the foreign intelligence services about Russia was found to be worthless, it was by no means worthless to the Soviet intelligence to know this.

Two basic elements are considered indispensable to enable the policymakers of a government to chart a correct foreign policy in a time of crisis. One is to know

the real power of their own country. The other is to know the power of the potential enemy. But to this a third element must be added: a government must also know the *image* of its own country as reflected in the eyes of the adversary. This is very important because, even if that image is distorted, *the adversary is going to act upon it.*

By infiltrating the intelligence services of foreign countries, the Soviet intelligence is able to learn and to report to the Soviet policymakers, how various states assess the capabilities, deficiencies, and military strength of the Soviet Union. It is then the task of the Soviet policymakers to try to foresee what mistakes the potential enemies of Russia will be likely to make, when the chips are down, as a result of the distorted view they hold about the Soviet Union as a world power.

The infiltration of a foreign intelligence service is a much more hazardous operation than the acquisition of informants in other government departments, because the officers of a foreign intelligence service are aware of these things and may maneuver the recruiting Soviet agent into a trap, or seize him outright before he has a chance to retreat. That is why the Foreign Directorate of the KGB advises its *residenturas* abroad not to rush things, but before attempting to recruit a foreign intelligence officer, to approach and cultivate a friend or relative of his first and then use that friend as a go-between. The *residenturas* are advised to arrange things in such a way that the actual recruiting should be done on the territory of a neighboring state and that until the recruited officer has proved his sincerity by turning over vital information to the Russians, the meetings with him should continue to take place

outside his country. However, the safest way to infiltrate a foreign intelligence service without fear of being caught in a trap is to plant a completely reliable person in that organization. Thus, for instance, an old and trusted informant who happens to be an officer in good standing in some other branch of the foreign government may be induced to seek employment with the intelligence service. Sometimes it may be necessary for him to become socially acquainted with a senior officer of the intelligence service first and thus pave the way for the appointment. Secret agents planted by the *residentura* in a foreign intelligence service can be used not only for the purpose of procuring secret information but also as a channel through which misinformation about the Soviet Union and other countries can be introduced.

It must be stated here that none of the world powers escaped the infiltration of its intelligence and security services by Soviet agents. General Walter Bedell Smith, the former head of the American C.I.A., was aware of the successes of the Soviet intelligence in this field and in September 1953 expressed his apprehension in the following words: "I believe the communists are so adroit and adept that they have infiltrated practically every security agency of the government."

The sixth line of Soviet intelligence consists of *influencing decisions of foreign governments* through secret agents in important positions within the councils of the foreign states. The history of the last two decades offers a number of examples of highly placed Soviet secret agents being able to tip the scales in the field of policymaking in favor of the Soviet Union. Some of these secret agents started out as junior diplomats in

the foreign offices of the West and climbed with the help of their socially prominent families to high government positions. Others were already mature politicians and statesmen when they were seduced by money and other base considerations. One of the leading members of Mussolini's cabinet and the Fascist Grand Council succumbed to an offer of money and agreed to collaborate with Soviet Russia.

In one mid-European country, a leading member of the parliament, who was not considered a friend of the Soviet Union, would meet the Soviet ambassador secretly and receive instructions from him concerning the position to take in certain matters affecting interests of Soviet Russia. In another European country an inspector of the national secret police, who became a secret Soviet informant, reported to the Soviet *residentura* that the police were in possession of documentary proof that an influential cabinet member of the country was a partner in a big narcotics ring and that together with a famous racketeer he owned a "luxurious" brothel in the center of the capital, a few blocks away from the presidency of the republic. The minister was so powerful in the councils of the government, as well as in the underworld, that the head of the secret police was afraid to denounce him. Moscow ordered the *residentura* to steal all the incriminating documents. After that, photographs of the documents were shown to the minister at the Soviet embassy by the Soviet ambassador himself, as a "friendly gesture." This ambassador happened to be none other than the former chief of the Foreign Department of the OGPU, that is, of Soviet intelligence. The ambassador's friendly gesture was well understood and served as a prelude which opened up a period of close collaboration between the highly

influential minister and the Soviet intelligence. His task was not merely to inform but to influence the policies of his government in the direction indicated by the Soviet Foreign Commissariat.

Two other functions belong to the same sixth line of activity of the KGB intelligence. One consists of paving the way for future negotiations between the Soviet Foreign Office and other governments on ticklish international matters. This is usually done by way of exploratory talks conducted by Soviet intelligence agents, through go-betweens or directly, with representatives of a foreign government. If the talks produce results satisfactory to both sides, the official diplomats of both countries take over. These exploratory talks were resorted to in cases in which the Kremlin wanted to be free to disclaim any knowledge of them. One Russian intelligence officer by the name of Ostrovsky, who had secretly negotiated the establishment of diplomatic relations with Romania, became the first Soviet ambassador to that country.

Another function along the same line of intelligence activity consisted of clandestine attempts to induce leaders of the political opposition in a foreign country to stage a *coup d'état* and take over the government. In such cases the Soviet government held out a promise of political and financial support and, if that particular state happened to be adjacent to the territory of the Soviet Union, military aid as well. Thus, in 1937, one of the chiefs of the KGB intelligence was commissioned by Stalin personally to enter into secret negotiations with former Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Titulescu, who lived at that time in Menton, on the Franco-Italian border, and persuade him to overthrow the reactionary regime of Prime Minister Maniu. Stalin

offered financial and military aid against a promise by Titulescu that upon assumption of power he would sign a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union.

The seventh line of the Soviet intelligence is the so-called *Industrial Intelligence*. Although intelligence as such has been known for hundreds of years, this was something new and was first initiated by the Soviets in 1929. Its purpose was to assist in the industrialization of the Soviet Union by stealing production secrets—new inventions, secret technological processes, etc.—from the advanced countries of Europe and America. With this assignment in mind the Soviet intelligence organizations abroad began to recruit into their network engineers, scientists, and inventors working in the laboratories and plants of the largest industrial concerns in the world. Striving to fulfill the five-year plans of industrialization, the Soviets were buying quantities of machinery and even whole plants from industrial companies in the West. At the same time they conducted negotiations with these companies for the purchase of patents and the know-how processes of production. A number of these were purchased, and foreign engineers began to arrive in Russia to instruct and train the Russians in the application of the new methods.

But often, when the price demanded by foreign concerns for their so-called "technical aid" was too high —it always ran into many millions of dollars—the head of the Soviet government would challenge the Foreign Department of the NKVD to steal the secret inventions from the Western companies. The response of the Foreign Department of the NKVD to these challenges was invariably enthusiastic, and after a number of successfully accomplished missions, the government created within the Foreign Department of the NKVD a new Division for Industrial Intelligence.

Sometimes, the theft of all the necessary formulas, blueprints, and instructions was insufficient to enable the Soviet engineers and inventors to reconstruct a complicated mechanism or to duplicate a production process. Something would be missing, and this *something* was the human element, the special skill and engineering instinct. In such cases officers of the Division for Industrial Intelligence would press the foreign engineers, with offers of additional rewards, to make a secret trip to Russia for a short time to instruct the Russian engineers and supervise the laboratory experiments on the spot. Preparing the trip, the Soviet *residentura* would take special precautions to insure that the passport of the traveler should not bear any border stamps and other traces of his visit to the Soviet Union. With this in mind, the engineer would apply for a passport and with it travel to the capital of an adjacent country. There he would turn his passport over to the local Soviet agent for safekeeping and get from him a false one on which he would proceed to Russia. On his return trip he would pick up his genuine passport where he had left it, turn in the false one, and continue homeward. The fees paid by the Russians for such trips ran sometimes as high as $10,000 for a few days' work, but the savings to the Soviets amounted to millions. The following illustrates how the Division of Industrial Intelligence worked in one of its standard operations.

As the Soviet Union was spending huge sums of money on industrial diamonds needed for the expanding oil industry, metallurgy, and various geological

projects, the Soviet government became interested in an offer made by the German Krupp concern to supply Russia with newly invented artificial diamonds which were almost as hard and good as natural ones. The new product was named *"widi,"* an abbreviation of *wie diamant,* which in German means "like diamond." The Soviet Commissariat of Heavy Industry bought some of the *widi* diamonds, tested them in drilling operations, and was amazed at their high quality. The commissariat decided to buy the patent for the production of *widi* from Krupp and have the German engineers build a plant in the Soviet Union. Soon a delegation of German experts headed by two Krupp directors arrived in Moscow. They knew how badly the Russians needed industrial diamonds for the five-year plan of industrialization and demanded a staggering price for the technical aid which Russia wanted.

When the deal was being discussed at the Politburo, Stalin turned to the head of the NKVD and said: "The bastards want too much money. Try to steal it from them. Show what the NKVD can do!" This was a challenge. One of the chiefs of the Foreign Department was charged with this operation. Before tackling the difficult assignment, it was necessary first to find out the location of the *widi*-producing plant and the names of the inventor and the engineers in charge of production. This task was assigned to a German scientist, Dr. B., who was a Soviet secret agent. Dr. B. looked up in the Berlin Technische Hochschule, with which he was associated, all the available data on the methods of achieving hard metal alloys and approached a noted professor who had written treatises on the subject. From him Dr. B. learned that a Krupp inventor had succeeded in attaining the hardest alloy known and that

it was being produced in a plant on the outskirts of Berlin. Dr. B. visited the site of the plant and dropped in at a beer hall where the technical personnel drank their beer. He visited the place a few times and engaged some of the technicians in conversations. Dr. B. represented himself as a scientist who was writing a book on hard-metal alloys. "Oh, then you are working with our Cornelius," said one technician. Dr. B. pricked up his ears, but said that he was not and remarked that he had known a Professor Cornelius. "No," said the technician, "he is not a professor, he is only a foreman in our plant, but he is a man who could teach the professors how to make industrial diamonds." Through an inspector of the Berlin Polizei Presidium, who was a secret Soviet informant, the Russian *residentura* obtained general information on Cornelius and his home address.

Next day, Dr. B. rang the doorbell of Cornelius' home. He was admitted by the wife of Cornelius. She told him that her husband had not yet returned from the plant, a fact which was known to Dr. B. He had come earlier on purpose, hoping that while waiting for Cornelius he might learn something about him from his wife. Dr. B. told her that he was a doctor of science who was writing a treatise on hard-metal alloys and that his colleagues from the Technische Hochschule advised him to see Mr. Cornelius, who might be helpful to him. He added that if Mr. Cornelius was really an expert in that field, he might earn some money on the side, if he were willing to contribute to the research. The wife of Cornelius felt very flattered that a scientist from the famous Technische Hochschule should come to seek advice of her husband. The prospect of earning extra money was also stimulating. She began to praise

her husband's abilities and high reputation at the plant. She said that the engineer who had invented the process of artificial diamonds trusted only her husband, because he alone knew how to handle the specially built electric oven, and that now, after the inventor had fallen out with the Krupps and quit, her husband was practically in charge of the whole thing. He could demand any salary he wanted from Krupp, and they would have to give it to him; but he is not that kind of a man . . . To him devotion to the company came first!

Soon Cornelius returned home. Dr. B. stated to him his problem, and in order to underscore his purely scientific interest in the matter and allay any possible suspicion, he invited Cornelius to his personal room at the Technische Hochschule for the coming Saturday. From the Technische Hochschule, Dr. B. took Cornelius for dinner to his luxurious ten-room flat in the eight-story apartment house which Dr. B. had inherited from his father.

Dr. B. saw at once that Cornelius was too illiterate technologically to be able to explain in scientific terms the secret of production, even if he wanted to. He was only a foreman who had been trained by the inventor to operate the oven. What Dr. B. wanted was to find out the name of the inventor, his whereabouts, and the history of his break with the Krupp concern. Dr. B. was very intelligent and knew how to stimulate a conversation and make a man talk. After an excellent dinner and a few glasses of strong brandy, Cornelius did not mind telling the story to his friendly host.

The inventor's name was Mr. Worm. When Worm saw at what fabulous prices Krupp was selling the industrial diamonds which he had created and which cost the company so little, he decided to build his own

shop secretly and then compete with Krupp. He rented a little shop, made an oven like the one he had constructed for Krupp, installed the minimum of equipment needed, and made a few profitable sales of the *widi* diamonds to foreign customers. With the money received he paid off some of the loans he got from the bank for launching his enterprise. Worm was on the way to becoming a rich man, but the Krupp concern soon learned about his disloyal competition and swooped down on him with all the fury of an industrial giant. Worm was summarily fired. His customers were warned that if they bought a single ounce of *widi* from him, Krupp would never sell them anything. The banks suddenly became rigid and demanded prompt payment from Worm, who, in spite of his talents as an engineer and inventor, could not find work. All the doors were politely but firmly closed in his face.

Dr. B. hurried to see Mr. Worm. Here, too, he managed to ring the doorbell when Worm was not at home. Dr. B. found that women were less secretive and more talkative than men, especially when they had an opportunity to do a bit of advertising for their husbands. Mr. Worm's wife was happy to hear that somebody had become interested in her husband. She must have been desperate enough to tell her husband's story to a complete stranger. The Krupps were brutes, she complained. They ruled the country. Her husband was a martyr. They had driven him to desperation. All his savings had gone into the enterprise, and it was ruined with one blow. Dr. B. listened to her story with unfeigned sympathy. He said that he had an interesting proposition for her husband which might get him out of his difficulties. From that moment on Mrs. Worm became his trusting friend. She believed this man would

find a way to save her husband from the strangling power of the Krupps. Because Worm was slow in coming, Dr. B. left without seeing him. He asked to have Worm call him up. Next day they met at the Technische Hochschule, and from there they went to Dr. B's apartment. Dr. B. told Worm that he knew about his difficulties and that if he wished to escape from the stranglehold of the Krupps, he must offer his talents to a foreign concern. Dr. B. said he knew a big Scandinavian company which might be interested in acquiring the secret process of *widi* production and in entering the field in competition with Krupp. A few days later, Dr. B. informed Worm that the company was definitely interested in the project and had authorized him to advance to Worm up to ten thousand German marks. He asked Worm to submit a statement on the *widi* production process and to furnish data about the equipment needed, its cost, etc. For the time being, Dr. B. declined to name the company. This did not necessarily look suspicious, because Dr. B., as a go-between, was entitled to a commission and might have been protecting his own interests. However, Worm got a strange hunch. "I want to warn you," said he to Dr. B., "that if my invention is needed for the Russians, I will have nothing to do with them!" Dr. B. was taken aback, but hastened to reassure him that it was a Scandinavian concern all right. As it has turned out, Worm was a fanatical Nazi and a Russian hater.

Something had to be done to placate that burning hatred if Worm was to be maneuvered into giving his *widi* invention to Russia. While Worm was writing the report, Dr. B. would raise the advance and add to it a thousand marks every week or so, which delighted Mrs. Worm. In the meantime Dr. B. had Worm and his

wife a few times for dinner at his home and tried to ingratiate himself with the lady. Mrs. Worm started to buy things which she had long been denying herself, while her husband kept a wary eye on his dwindling advance. Dr. B. noticed this and immediately came to her assistance. He began to give her money in secret from Worm with the understanding that she would repay it when her husband struck it rich. Dr. B. was convinced that a prosperous future awaited Worm just around the corner.

Meanwhile, the account submitted by Worm was sent to Moscow. After a close study the Russian engineers declared that without the personal guidance of the inventor they would not be able to construct the special oven, which was supposed to make several thousand revolutions a minute under an enormously high temperature. Moscow wanted to have the inventor at all cost. And so Dr. B's friendship with Worm's wife paid off. She cajoled her husband for a week until she brought him to realize that they had no choice and that this was their last and only chance. The Soviet trade delegation in Berlin signed an official two-year contract with Worm, according to which he received a certain sum in German currency, a salary for himself in Russian rubles, and a monthly allowance in German marks for his wife, who preferred to remain in Germany. Worm was entitled to a suite in a first-class Moscow hotel, with restaurant and other services and also to a chauffeured automobile and to two vacations in Germany a year at Russia's expense. He took with him to Moscow a German engineer by the name of Mente who had been his assistant at the Krupp plant. Worm's letters to his wife breathed hatred toward everything Russian. He contracted rheumatic fever there and re-

turned to Germany a disappointed and broken man. But he fulfilled his contract with the Soviets to the letter and gave them his most cherished invention.

The Division of Industrial Intelligence of the NKVD regarded the recruited foreign engineers, scientists, and inventors as its potential reserve of outstanding experts on whose collaboration the Soviet Union could count in time of war. And, indeed, when World War II broke out, most of these engineers and inventors were mobilized or integrated into the war effort in their respective countries together with the laboratories and plants where they worked. Many of them, especially those in the United States and Great Britain, were entrusted with the most sensitive projects on which the very outcome of the war depended. No wonder that the Soviet Union was in a position to know about, and often to help itself to, the newest achievements attained in the field of armaments in the leading industrial countries. The thefts of the greatest inventions of our times by the Soviet intelligence are now a matter of record, and some of the foreign scientists and engineers, such as Harry Gold, Dr. Klaus Fuchs, and Allan Nunn May, have been exposed as Soviet agents.

The eighth line of activity of the KGB intelligence is concerned with sabotage and guerrilla warfare and will be discussed in a later chapter.

III. The Illegal *Residentura* and the New Identity

The Foreign Directorate of the KGB, as well as the Intelligence Department of the Soviet Army, maintains two distinct types of intelligence organizations in foreign countries. One is called "legal *residentura*" and the other "illegal *residentura.*" Both are engaged in espionage activities directed against the foreign states in which they operate, and thus their work is equally illegal as far as the laws of the foreign countries are concerned. The reason why one type has come to be called, or rather misnamed, "legal" stems from the simple fact that the Soviet intelligence officers who direct the work of the *residentura* reside in the foreign country legally, as members of the staff of the Soviet embassy or of another official Soviet agency. On the other hand, if the *residentura* is directed by Soviet intelligence officers who conceal the fact that they are Russians and reside in the foreign country with forged papers, it is called "illegal."

Until the late 1920's, the Soviet intelligence operations abroad were directed from the Soviet embassies exclusively. During that period the "legal" *residenturas* accomplished a lot of highly successful work. However, one aspect of these *residenturas* troubled the Soviet government. Each time a spy ring working for the Soviets was exposed, the trail led straight to the Soviet embassy with all the resulting adverse publicity. And

when some of the arrested spies turned out to be communists, the press would raise a bitter campaign against the local Communist party, branding it as a gang of Soviet spies masquerading as a legitimate political party. What the Soviet government wanted was to reorganize its intelligence operations on foreign soil in such a manner that if some of its agents were caught, the trail would not lead to the Soviet embassy, and the Soviet government would be able to disclaim any connection with the exposed spy ring.

The answer to this dilemma was the creation of the so-called "illegal *residentura.*" The principal new feature of that intelligence apparatus consisted in the fact that it was completely divorced from the Soviet embassy and operated in the underground from top to bottom. The Soviet intelligence officers in charge of the secret network no longer enjoyed the immunity of the Soviet embassy and the privileges of the diplomatic Soviet passport, or the facilities of the diplomatic pouch in which the stolen foreign secrets could be easily channeled to Moscow. The Soviet officers went "underground," disguised as businessmen or people of other professions, concealing their Russian nationality and hiding their identity under the cover of false foreign passports and other tricky devices. Gone was the assurance of the officer that if caught the Soviet government would launch a vigorous protest and fight for his release.

It must be noted here that, although the underground *residenturas* gradually took over the major part of the intelligence activities abroad, the legal *residenturas* were not abolished. When it came to that, the chiefs of Soviet intelligence had a change of heart and decided that it would be advantageous to Soviet intelligence to observe the international scene through two independent sets of agents and check the information supplied by one against the data received from the other. The underground *residenturas* were given broad discretional powers and an extensive scope of activities. On the other hand, the tasks of the legal *residenturas* were reduced to the most essential problems, and the residents were ordered to abstain from too risky operations that might involve the prestige of the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet intelligence services (of the KGB and of the army) retained a dual system of *residenturas,* the so-called "legal" and "illegal."

The transition of the Soviet intelligence to underground methods of operation was not easy. The difficulty lay in the fact that there were not many intelligence officers who knew languages well enough to be able to pass for nationals of foreign countries. To overcome this difficulty a vigorous training program had been introduced. To qualify for a foreign assignment in the underground, the officer had to meet a number of requirements: (1) He had to have previous experience in intelligence and counterintelligence. (2) He had to acquire a working knowledge of the language of the country of his proposed assignment and to master the language of the country of which he would represent himself to be citizen. (3) Inasmuch as the officer was obliged to conceal his real past, he had to contrive and prepare for himself a new and sound life story which could withstand at least superficial investigation. (4) He had to acquire a legitimate occupation or business cover which would justify in the eyes of the authorities his protracted sojourn in their country. The duty of the passport desk of the Foreign Department of the KGB was to provide the officer with a genuine-looking

foreign passport that would blend with his personal characteristics and to instruct him on various technicalities connected with its use.

The passport of a person is an important part of his identity, and for that reason all intelligence services take pains to provide their undercover agents with the best passports possible, the forgery of which would be difficult to uncover. When the NKVD intelligence had just begun to build its underground network in a number of countries, it resorted to two methods of obtaining foreign passports for its operatives. One consisted of using a genuine passport of a foreigner who had immigrated to the Soviet Union and substituting the photograph of the operative for the photograph of the former bearer. However, this method was not considered safe enough because a close examination of the passport by experts under a proper lamp would have disclosed that the photograph had been changed. The second method consisted of the outright fabrication of foreign passports by highly skilled experts at the Soviet government engraving offices. These passports were so perfect that even experienced engravers were unable to distinguish them from genuine ones. But they had one inherent weakness. In case the bearer of the passport fell under the suspicion of the police, it was enough for them to make an inquiry at the passport office of the country which had allegedly made out the passport, and they would be informed that such a passport, in the name of so and so, had never been issued.

In view of the defectiveness of both methods, the NKVD intelligence began to look for a more satisfactory solution of the problem. All Soviet *residenturas* abroad were instructed to explore in great detail the

procedure of the issuance of passports in various countries of Europe and America, and when all the gathered data was studied in Moscow, the intelligence chiefs came to the conclusion that with the proper application of a certain amount of fraud their agents could acquire genuine passports direct from government passport offices in the same way that citizens of those countries did. All the Soviet intelligence officer had to do was to pretend to be a citizen of the country, furnish corroborating proof to that effect, and apply for a travel passport.

The first attempts of this kind proved very successful, and soon Soviet agents began to show each other with pride their genuine passports with their own photographs affixed to them. The most popular passport among Soviet intelligence officers was that of the United States. And no wonder. The American passport carried with it the prestige of a great power, and the police agencies of Europe and Asia did not dare, at least in those times, to arrest or search an American citizen with the same want of consideration and recklessness which they were prone to display toward a citizen of Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, or Honduras. The American passport afforded still another advantage: with it a traveler could go to many countries without the need to apply for an entrance visa. But the main advantage of the American passport lay in the fact that its bearer was not obliged to speak perfect English because the United States has millions of naturalized citizens who had come from tsarist Russia and whose English is far from perfect, and is often outright poor.

In the United States the Soviet agents obtain passports by various artifices, of which I shall mention two:

(1) The intelligence agent acquires naturalization papers belonging to a Russian immigrant; pretending that they are his own he presents them to a local branch of the Passport Division of the State Department, fills out the proper application form, and requests that a passport be issued to him for foreign travel. He swears to the truthfulness of the information furnished in the application and invites two witnesses to verify his identity under oath.

It goes without saying that when the intelligence agent selects naturalization papers for himself he must see to it that the age and other personal data which they contain should coincide with his own. How careful one must be with these things, one can judge from the following episode. In 1930 a Soviet intelligence agent who was thirty years old acquired somebody's naturalization papers and was about to present them to the Passport Division with his application. While he talked things over with the men who were going to accompany him to the government office as witnesses, one of them noticed that the year of birth entered in the naturalization certificate was 1877, which would make the applicant fifty-three years old. The intelligence officer was greatly surprised. To him the figure 1877 looked like 1899, because the Americans inscribe the digit "7" exactly as the Russians write "9."

The officer who has acquired an American passport through fraud does not feel completely safe as long as his double, the real owner of the naturalization papers, continues to live in the United States. For that reason, the Russians try to persuade Americans whose papers have been fraudulently used, to immigrate to Russia, where they are given jobs and financial aid.

(2) The Soviet intelligence agents obtain American

passports also by the following ruse: they examine birth and death records in the archives of the department of health and take down the data of the birth and death of a male child many years back. If the date of birth is more or less that of the intelligence officer and he likes the name and place of birth, he obtains for a nominal fee a photostat of the birth entry. Claiming it as his own, the agent applies on the basis of the photostat for a passport. Two witnesses confirm under oath that they had known the applicant for at least five years and they certify his identity.

To pose at the Division of Passports as a born American, the intelligence agent must, of course, speak English well enough not to arouse the suspicion of the government clerk. But in cases when the clerk had been bribed, the inadequacy of the applicant's English does not matter. Later, in his future associations with other Americans, the intelligence officer can explain away his foreign accent by telling them that when he was still a child his parents took him to another country where he was brought up and that later he returned to the United States and claimed citizenship, to which he was entitled by virtue of birth.

The United States is not the only country where the Russian agents acquire passports by false pretenses. In every large country the Soviet intelligence finds loopholes in the existing passport regulations through which it obtains genuine passports for its undercover agents. In some countries the Soviet intelligence keeps on its payroll clerks from government passport bureaus.

Soviet women, who work in the underground *residenturas,* acquire foreign passports by the same means as do men. But they have at their disposal an even better way, which can never be exposed—marriage,

fictitious marriage, of course. According to the laws of a number of countries, as in England for instance, foreign women who marry nationals of those countries automatically acquire the citizenship of their husbands. One Soviet woman who needed a British passport to take up her assignment in Japan told me that when she married an Englishman and applied in London for a British passport, the government clerk explained to her that it would take about two weeks, but that if she wanted to get the passport sooner she might have it in one or two days on the payment of a nominal fee. She did so and got her passport the next day.

Fictitious marriages became a fashionable phenomenon in the 1930's. Owing to the growth of anti-Fascist sentiments among university students, especially in Great Britain and the United States, many young men, mostly from wealthy and aristocratic families, lent themselves to the role of fictitious husbands *for the cause*. Some kept such marriages secret from their families, but others brought their wives home to the consternation of their parents. Only rarely have the fictitious marriages evolved into genuine ones; in most cases the husband and bride drifted apart without even the benefit of a proper honeymoon. A few of these women married sons of millionaires, but I have yet to hear that one of them has tried to get a portion of her rich husband's estate in a divorce suit.

The Soviet intelligence used to obtain passports also from a few foreign consuls who were on the Soviet payroll, and there were instances when they intervened energetically in behalf of their "citizens" when these got in trouble with the security authorities. I remember a case when D. Smirnov, a former secretary of the Soviet embassy in Paris, was detained by the Polish

border police when he was passing through Poland on the way to the Soviet Union with a Greek passport. The reason for his detention was that two Polish police officers recognized Smirnov as the man who a year before had traveled from the Soviet Union to France, through Poland, with a Soviet diplomatic passport. To make things worse our Greek traveler could not say a single word in Greek. However, the Greek consul in Danzig who had supplied Smirnov with the passport rushed personally to his defense and insisted that the bearer of the passport was Greek. He agreed to certify this in writing. The Poles, evidently, had some regard for the consul (or may be he was supplying them with passports too), and Smirnov was released with an apology delivered in pure Russian.

No matter how good the passport acquired by the agent may be, a skillful investigation will sooner or later establish that its bearer is not its lawful owner. A false passport serves the intelligence agent well only till the day when he has fallen under the surveillance of the authorities. It also affords the agent a breathing spell (while the document is being checked) during which he may escape.

It must be understood that a man is physically unable to assume the traits and characteristics of another man to such an extent that people would not be able to distinguish him from the man whom he tries to impersonate. In our civilized society the past of a man leaves indelible traces, and various phases of this past can be verified. Let us assume that a Soviet operative has succeeded in misrepresenting the naturalization papers of a Russian immigrant, Peter Gorin, as his own and in acquiring for himself an American passport in

that name. Let us also assume that the personal characteristics of the Soviet agent (age, height, and other traits) jibe completely with those of Gorin. Let us also suppose that the real Gorin has been persuaded to go to Russia, leaving the Soviet agent as the only Gorin as far as the naturalization papers and passport are concerned. But in spite of all that, it would be enough for the police authorities to dig a little deeper and the forgery would inevitably come to light.

The authorities would have only to show Gorin's passport photograph to those who had attended school with him or had worked with him to find that this was not the picture of the Gorin they had known. It would be enough to compare the handwriting of the suspected Gorin with that of the real one (his school papers, applications for social security, or life insurance) and the masquerade would be over.

However, thanks to its constant striving toward perfection, the Soviet intelligence has in many cases succeeded in contriving such artful ruses as have lent an almost indestructible authenticity to the concocted identity of the agent and made it impervious to exposure. How this was done can be seen from the following examples.

In the Foreign Department of the NKVD there served an intelligence officer by the name of Alexander Karin, known as the man who had recruited and trained the famous Soviet agent Richard Sorge who created a fabulous network of spies in Japan and succeeded in warning the Soviet government of the exact date when the German armies would invade the Soviet Union. Karin was an able operative and had worked abroad with a Latvian and later with an Austrian passport, but

he did not know a single foreign language well enough to justify his continued service in the underground under the cover of a false passport. Being an ambitious operative, Karin did not want to quit the venturesome underground.

One day, a bright idea occurred to the chief of the Foreign Department of the NKVD, Artouzov, who was a friend of Karin. Artouzov had lived in Switzerland before the Russian Revolution. He had known a well-to-do couple there, whose daughter went on a trip to Russia at the beginning of the century, and had met and married a young Russian teacher. In 1903 she gave birth to a boy. When the child was seven, his mother died. The grandparents in Switzerland showed great concern for their grandson and were in constant correspondence with his father.

When in 1917 the country was swept by the Revolution and civil war accompanied by mass migration of the population, the old people lost track of their grandson. The letters they wrote to Russia remained unanswered. Artouzov sized up this drama and suggested that Karin impersonate the grandson, enter into correspondence with the family of "his" late mother, and express a desire to emigrate to Switzerland. Meanwhile, the grandfather died, but the old lady was still alive. Her two sons were wealthy businessmen with respectable positions in Swiss society. In accord with Artouzov's plan, a touching correspondence sprang up between the grandson (Karin) and his grandmother. He sent her the old photographs and letters of his "poor mother," and hinted that he would like to emigrate to Switzerland if this were possible. The Swiss family at once mobilized all its connections among the diplomatic

and business circles in Europe inviting them to use their influence with the Soviet authorities and persuade them to allow the young man to leave Russia.

The Soviet authorities, that is, Artouzov himself, proved sympathetic toward the Swiss family and granted an exit visa to the young man, his wife, and little daughter. Karin was greatly depressed by the ignominious role he played and the warmth with which he was received by the Swiss family. The experience proved too great for the frail old lady. She died a couple of months later, happy in the belief that God had heard her prayers and fulfilled her cherished wish to see her grandson before she died. She bequeathed to Karin her house and a little estate, and soon, thanks to the unflagging solicitude of his uncles, Karin obtained a genuine Swiss passport, the authenticity of which no authorities would be able to dispute.

Another example of the inexhaustible inventiveness of the Soviet intelligence can be drawn from a more recent event. In 1927 a Finnish immigrant in the United States, who apparently was not doing too well in this country, decided to return to Finland with his American-born wife and son Eugene. The boy, Eugene Maki, was then eight years old.

Many years later, in 1951, a man of about thirty, entered the American legation in Helsinki, Finland, produced his American birth certificate issued by the state of Idaho in the name of Eugene Maki and said he wished to return to the United States with his young Finnish wife. As a born American, Maki was entitled to this, and a year later he was issued an American passport and left for the United States.

Everything in this episode was perfectly normal, except for one thing: the man who presented himself as

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Eugene Maki, born in Enaville, Idaho, in 1919, was not Maki at all, but a Soviet KGB intelligence agent who was assigned to do espionage work in the United States. No investigative authorities in the world, no matter how clever, would be able to uncover the fraud and break the ironclad identity so masterfully created by the intelligence service for its agent, and this story would have never been revealed had not "Eugene Maki" himself, after four years of espionage activities in this country, suddenly decided to break with the Soviet Union and expose the Russian espionage activities in the United States. The real name of the man who posed as Eugene Maki is Reino Hayhanen, whose revelations culminated in the arrest and sensational trial of Colonel Rudolph Abel, who was Hayhanen's immediate superior.